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Freeman, Gregory A. Sailors to the End: The Deadly
Fire on the USS Forrestal and the Heroes Who
Fought It. New York: William Morrow, 2002.
293pp. $25.95

Since its release in 1973, the training film
Trial by Fire has been seen by hundreds
of thousands of officers and sailors during mandatory shipboard firefighting
training—training improved in no small
part by the lessons learned from the
Forrestal tragedy. Undoubtedly many
(this reviewer among them) have wondered what it must have been like to
have been on the Forrestal that hot July
day in 1967 when the crew fought to
save their ship. Through interviews with
survivors, relatives of victims, and the
meticulous mining of official U.S. Navy
files, Gregory Freeman, former Associated Press reporter turned freelance
journalist, seeks to capture the human
emotions of the day and explore the
question of why this tragedy happened.
Weaving a thoroughly engaging, often
riveting tale as seen through the eyes of
selected Forrestal sailors, Freeman fully
meets his remit while describing the role
that chance played that day in selecting
who would live and who would die. He
concludes, justly, that this was a tragedy
that need not have happened, and in doing
so he focuses on a causal factor—World
War II–era thousand-pound bombs—
that has been less fully recognized until
now.
The book is divided into three major
sections. The first six chapters introduce
the Forrestal crewmen who play key roles
in Freeman’s story. For the civilian
reader, this section will serve as a primer
to life in the U.S. Navy in general, and to
duty onboard an aircraft carrier specifically. It is also in this section that the
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few flaws in the book are found. Perhaps
invisible to the layman, errors—such as
calling a commander a “high-ranking
enlisted man” or stating that “landing
without killing anybody or causing damage usually got you an OK grade” (generations of aviators wish it were so)—
will jump out at the informed reader.
While small, the errors do distract from
an otherwise meticulously researched
book.
The next eight chapters form the heart of
the book. Here Freeman accelerates the
pace, using literary snapshots taken
through the eyes of the crew members to
build an appreciation of the tension and
fear felt on board the carrier that day. At
1051 on 29 July 1967, a Zuni air-toground rocket fired from an F-4 Phantom near the aft end of the flight deck,
knocking off a fuel tank hung beneath an
A-4 Skyhawk among Air Wing 17 aircraft preparing for a major strike in Vietnam. While certainly unexpected, the
initial response to the Zuni launch and
the resultant fire was by the book—a situation that changed dramatically with
the explosion (just ninety-four seconds
later) of the first thousand-pound bomb.
In stark and realistic terms Freeman describes the efforts over the next twenty
hours of Captain John Beling and his
well-meaning but inexperienced crew to
ensure that their ship would survive.
These 150 pages are exceptionally engaging and so successful in capturing the
stress and emotion of the crisis that they
grab readers and leave them emotionally
exhausted. In particular, the description
of the death of sailor James Blaskis in a
remote and inaccessible part of the ship
cannot leave a reader unmoved. One
hundred thirty-three other Forrestal
crew members and air wing personnel
were killed; many died heroically.
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The final three-chapter section deals
with the aftermath. The cause of the fire
must be investigated, answers found,
survivors treated, the dead buried, and
the ship re-find its soul. Freeman describes well the aftermath of the tragedy
and the difficulty finding the truth when
some of the men had become primarily
concerned with themselves.
In the end the official causes were determined. Independently, two shipboard
groups had each bypassed one of two
in-place safety features, confident that
the other would suffice. Additionally,
obsolete and less fire-resistant bombs
had been transferred to Forrestal and
loaded on the attack aircraft that morning—a point not fully explored previously. While no specific personal blame
was assigned, without the negative synergy created by the convergence of these
three decisions this would most likely
have been just another unremarkable
and short-lived flight-deck fire.
JAMES E. HICKEY

Commander, U.S. Navy
Naval War College

Weir, Gary E. An Ocean in Common: American
Naval Officers, Scientists, and the Ocean Environment. College Station: Texas A&M Univ. Press,
2001. 403pp. $44.95

Gary Weir has scored another hit. Using
the approach he fashioned in Forged in
War: The Naval-Industrial Complex and
American Submarine Construction,
1940–1961, the head of the Contemporary Branch of the Naval Historical Center has turned his keen analytical mind
and sharp sense of political realism to
the linked topics of the U.S. Navy and
the practical science of oceanography.
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The book is divided into three chronological segments: from World War I to
1940, the Second World War, and the
Cold War up to the administration of
President John F. Kennedy. In each of
these eras the submarine exerted a transforming impact on naval strategy and
operations. The revolution began in
1914, when the U-boat explosively demonstrated the magnitude of its threat to
the security of transatlantic shipping and
to the political survival of Great Britain.
The German undersea offensive and the
resultant Anglo-American antisubmarine warfare (ASW) forcibly introduced
an unwelcome third dimension into
combat at sea, the comprehension of
which exceeded the professional and
technological competence of even the
best-educated American naval officers.
The massive, opaque, and largely uncharted subsurface domain could be
mastered as a theater for warfare only if
the Navy enlisted the expertise of oceanographers, who themselves represented
little more than a loosely organized
multidisciplinary specialty operating on
the fringe of institutional academic respectability. If the Navy needed their expertise in order to fight underwater, the
oceanographers needed the Navy’s funding in order to prosper in academe.
Weir begins his analysis of the submarine as the deus ex machina of twentieth
century, oceanographically determined
maritime warfare with a New York
meeting on antisubmarine warfare
chaired by the inventor Thomas Alva
Edison in March 1917. The specialists at
the gathering, Weir writes, “concluded
that underwater sound and echo ranging
offered the most promising avenue of
exploration for ASW scientists in the war
effort. Physics and physical oceanography thus immediately became vital to
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